By Hallvard Lillehammer, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Genuine Metaphysics brings jointly new articles via prime metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's extraordinary contribution to metaphysics. probably the most impressive minds of present occasions shed new gentle on the entire major subject matters in metaphysics: fact, causation, inclinations and homes, clarification, and time. on the finish of the ebook, Hugh Mellor responds to the problems raised through all of the 13 participants and provides us new perception into his personal hugely influential paintings on metaphysics.
Part of the Routledge reports in 20th Century Philosophy series.
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Additional resources for Real Metaphysics: Essays in honour of D. H. Mellor
It is because Ajax purrs more than once, and we need different truthmakers for different truths about when he purrs, that we need different facta with different locations but exactly the same constituents. Is that a problem? I said that I did not understand the ‘unmereological composition’ of Armstrong’s states of affairs; no more do I understand it in the case of Mellor’s facta. Since I do not understand ‘unmereological composition’, I do not know what rules it ought to follow. Therefore, I know of no reason why different facta should not have the very same constituents.
Cats. So it is true because there is a cat. Call a proposition positive existential – for short, positive – just in case it has a truthmaker in any world where it is true. Some philosophers hold the Truthmaker Principle: they say that every truth must have a truthmaker. That is, all propositions are positive. In recent times, the Truthmaker Principle has been advocated by C. B. Martin, then by D. M. Armstrong, then (either in its original form or in revised versions) by many others (Fox 1987; Bigelow 1988; Armstrong 1989; Martin 1996; Mellor 1998: 19–28; Lewis forthcoming).
One thing in this world may have one counterpart in that world, or two, or even more, or none; and two in this world may share a common counterpart in that world. Counterpart theory makes a kind of sense of essentialism: a is essentially F just in case all of a’s counterparts (including a itself) are F. But this is a half-hearted and flexible essentialism. The truth of (all but the most trivial) essentialist judgements is relative to the counterpart relation. Indeed Quine (1976) once formulated his well-known misgivings about essentialism exactly as a complaint that we have no determinate counterpart relation.